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I. INTRODUCTION
The ability of technology to extend and improve quality of life
continually shapes not only the field of medicine as a whole but also the
way in which healthcare is conceptualized and accessed at the individual
level. 1 As technological advancements continue to materialize at an
exceedingly rapid pace, medical innovations are generally touted as being
capable of providing patients with significant benefits and, as a result, the
healthcare industry tends to fervently embrace emergent technologies. 2
This tendency is counterbalanced by the U.S. Federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), which conditions the implementation of medical
technology on the satisfaction of high regulatory standards aimed at
ensuring an appropriate balance of safety and efficacy. 3 Within this
overarching medical landscape, the medical device industry is one facet
that mirrors these overall trends and tendencies. 4
Medical device innovation capitalizes on advances in science and
engineering to adapt biotechnology, nanotechnology, and computer
technology, among other fields, to medical applications.5 Initially, medical
devices were relied on to work in a discrete manner, and their narrowly
tailored range of functionality enabled the FDA to regulate with a relatively
*
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1
Susan Bartlett Foote, Frontiers of Medical Technology: Reflections on the
Intersection of Innovation and the Health Care System, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 79, 80
(2005-2006).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 82–83.
4
Id. at 81.
5
Id.
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high degree of certainty.6 Over time, however, technology has progressed
to the point where devices are no longer finite but instead are developed to
have adaptive functions.7 The critical question faced at this juncture is how
the FDA should anticipate continued evolution in the medical device sector
and prepare for the increased need to regulate software-based devices. 8
This Comment will analyze the inability of the FDA’s current
regulatory scheme to remain effectual in light of trends evinced by the
healthcare industry as a whole. Rather than developing broad-based
solutions, the healthcare industry is utilizing technology to target and
remediate medical conditions at the individual level and will increasingly
rely on measures such as robotic process automation and artificial
intelligence to achieve this aim. 9 The current regulatory approval process,
which is predicated on the immutability of medical devices, is ill-equipped
to evaluate and approve technology-based devices, which are inherently
variable.10 Using this identified deficiency as a framework, this Comment
will evaluate and compare the relative merits of implementing a novel
regulatory pathway as compared to working within the existing regulatory
landscape. This Comment will provide a detailed analysis of the trends in
medical technology and the ways in which artificial intelligence has, and
will continue to, advance the field of medicine. In many respects,
technological innovation will continue to improve lives by redefining the
boundaries of what the healthcare industry considers medically feasible. 11
Notwithstanding its innovative potential, technology is imperfect, rendering
vigilant oversight and adept regulation not only paramount but
indispensable. 12 In anticipation of the imminent and unprecedented surge
in the technology-driven medical device sector, the FDA must be equipped
to regulate such devices.13 To successfully achieve the FDA’s mandate,
this Comment recommends the implementation of a unique framework for
vetting the safety and efficacy of algorithm-based medical devices that are

6

Suzanne Junod, Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the 1976 Medical Device
Amendments, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 26, 26–27 (2017).
7
Id. at 30.
8
Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1673 (2016).
9
Junod, supra note 6, at 30; see also Ohm & Reid, supra note 8, at 1673.
10
Ohm & Reid, supra note 8, at 1673.
11
Elizabeth Kelly, Comment, FDA Regulation of 3D-Printed Organs and Associated
Ethical Challenges, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 517 (2018).
12
Anna B. Laakmann, Customized Medicine and the Limits of Federal Regulatory
Power, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 285, 325 (2016).
13
Id.
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to some degree indeterminant because of their adaptive functionality.
II. THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FDA MEDICAL DEVICE
APPROVAL
Section II offers a broad overview of the federal regulation of medical
devices. 14 First, the major historical developments resulting in the FDA’s
authority to regulate medical devices and the ensuing three-tiered device
classification system are explained. 15 Second, the general policy goals of
the current classification system are explored. 16 Finally, the authority of
the FDA to regulate medical devices is contrasted with the definitive
prohibition against its regulation of the practice of medicine. 17
A. The Regulation and Classification of Medical Devices
The authority of the FDA to require advanced approval of new
medical products is the result of incremental changes to the statutory
regime over time. 18 Before the twentieth century, drug and device
manufacturers were under no federal obligation to provide evidence of the
safety, efficacy, or quality of the products they produced. 19 Congress
passed the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1938, conferring
regulatory control of drugs and medical devices on the FDA. 20 Initially,
this grant of authority as it pertained to the medical device sector was
limited, allowing the FDA to safeguard against the adulteration and
misbranding of medical devices but not to require pre-market regulation. 21
The absence of an express statutory grant of authority to regulate devices
14
Spenser F. Powell, Changing Our Minds: Reforming the FDA Medical Device
Reclassification Process, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 177, 182 (2018).
15
Id.
16
Id. at 195.
17
FDA’s Role in Regulating Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/home-use-devices/fdas-role-regulating-medicaldevices (last updated Aug. 31, 2018).
18
See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical
Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1757–58 (1996).
19
See generally id.; see also Kyle Lennox, Substantially Unequivalent: Reforming
FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, U. ILL. L. REV. 1363, 1370 (2014) (“Many
remedies . . . for various ailments were not actually tested for their safety or effectiveness
and were generally sold without guarantee of their safety, quality, or proven benefit.”).
20
Bonnie Scott, Oversight Overhaul: Eliminating the Premarket Review of Medical
Devices and Implementing a Provider-Centered Postmarket Surveillance Strategy, 66 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 377, 380 (2011); see also Peter Barton Hutt, A History of Government
Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Medical Devices, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J.
99, 104 (1989).
21
Scott, supra note 20, at 380.
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prior to market entry resulted in the FDA classifying some devices as drugs
under the FDCA.22
The FDA did not gain expansive authority over device regulation until
1976 when the enactment of the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to
the FDCA established a new regulatory framework. 23 The MDA nullified
the FDA’s devices-as-drugs workaround by broadly defining “device” as:
any instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance,
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article . . .
intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions,
or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in
man . . . [or] intended to affect the structure or any function of
the body . . . .24
Further, the MDA created a classification framework predicated on
increasing levels of FDA controls and pre-market scrutiny for each device
class.25 Pursuant to the MDA framework, the degree of risk associated
with a proposed device dictates the level of pre-market control.26 The
MDA classification system categorizes devices into one of three risk-based
categories: Class I, Class II, or Class III.27 In general, Class III is the
default categorization for new, post-1976 devices unless the FDA
determines that the device meets one of two exceptions. 28 First, a device
may be found to be “substantially equivalent” to a predicate device that the
FDA has already classified as either Class I or Class II. 29 Second, the
“FDA may make a de novo determination that a device” satisfies the
statutory definition of either Class I or Class II.30

22
Powell, supra note 14, at 183; see Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,
Pub. L. No. 116-22 §§ 505(a)–(b), 52 Stat. 1052 (amended 2019) (Under the FDCA, drug
manufacturers were prohibited from introducing new drugs into interstate commerce
without first filing an application with the FDA. Pursuant to this requirement, drug
manufacturers had to provide “full reports of investigations which have been made to show
whether or not such drug is safe for use.” If the FDA determined that the proffered evidence
was insufficient to establish the drug’s safety, it was able to deny the application.).
23
Scott, supra note 20, at 380; Hutt, supra note 20, at 112; 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)
(2012).
24
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012).
25
Powell, supra note 14, at 184.
26
Scott, supra note 20, at 380; Hutt, supra note 20, at 112; 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1).
27
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1).
28
Powell, supra note 14, at 186.
29
Id.; 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(f)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).
30
Powell, supra note 14, at 186; 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(f)(2)–(3).
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1. Class I: General Controls
Class I devices fall at the lowest end of the risk spectrum. 31
Accordingly, the FDA considers adherence to general regulatory controls,
which apply to all medical devices, sufficient to provide reasonable
assurance of safety and efficacy. 32 General controls require compliance
with the statutory protections pertaining to adulteration, misbranding, FDA
registration and listing requirements, FDA labeling regulations, and good
manufacturing practices.33 Examples of Class I devices include dental
floss, adhesive bandages, surgical gloves, and other similar, low risk
products.34
Initially, all Class I devices were subject to pre-market notification
under section 510(k) of the FDCA.35 Pre-market notification requires
device manufacturers to file notification with the FDA at least ninety days
prior to introducing a medical device into interstate commerce. 36 Based on
the understanding that Class I devices present minimal health or safety
risks, the FDA has exempted the majority of Class I and select Class II
devices from the pre-market notification requirement. 37
2. Class II: Special Controls
Class II devices occupy the midrange of the risk spectrum and are
subject to both general and special controls. 38 Special controls tend to be
device-specific and include, among other things, compliance with
performance standards, post-market surveillance, and patient registries. 39
31

21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
Id.;
see
Regulatory
Controls,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/overview-device-regulation/regulatory-controls (last
updated Mar. 27, 2018).
33
21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1) (2016); Scott, supra note 20, at 380; Regulatory Controls,
supra note 32.
34
Powell, supra note 14, at 186.
35
Powell, supra note 14, at 187 n.83 (Despite the fact that the requirements for premarket notification are now codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2012), this form of review is
commonly referred to as the “510(k) process,” in reference to section 510(k) of the original
MDA.).
36
21 C.F.R. § 807.81(a) (2016); see also 21 C.F.R. § 807.87 (2016) (specifying the
requirements of a premarket notification submission, which include device name, owner’s
establishment registration number, device class and classification panel, actions taken to
comply with any performance standards, proposed labeling, and information supporting any
claim of substantial equivalence to a predicate device).
37
Scott, supra note 20, at 377–78.
38
21 U.S.C. § 360c (a)(1)(B); Scott, supra note 20, at 377–78; Powell, supra note 14,
at 187.
39
21 U.S.C. § 360c (a)(1)(B); Scott, supra note 20, at 377–78; Powell, supra note 14,
32
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Examples of Class II devices include contact lenses, infusion pumps, and
CT scanners.40
Unlike the vast majority of Class I devices, almost all Class II devices
must comply with the FDA’s general pre-market notification requirement. 41
Post-amendment devices, namely those that were not on the market when
the MDA were enacted, must establish that they are “substantially
equivalent” to a predicate device already on the market through a 510(k)
submission. 42 If a proposed device “has the same intended use as the
predicate . . . [and] the same technological characteristics . . . or has the
same intended use[,] . . . different technological characteristics . . . [that do]
not raise different questions of safety and effectiveness, and . . . is at least
as safe and effective as the legally marketed device[,]” then it may be
deemed substantially equivalent and bypass the need for clinical testing. 43
Although the 510(k) provision was initially intended to be temporary,
it has not only endured but has become the principal pathway to market for
many new devices. 44 Device manufacturers are obligated to submit a premarket notification submission upon first introducing a new device into the
market, modifying the device in a manner that could significantly affect its
safety or effectiveness, or proposing a new intended use for a device that is
already on the market. 45 Government agencies, such as the Institute of
Medicine, and commentators alike have suggested that the prevalence and
relative ease of satisfying pre-market notification requirements increases
the risk that unsafe or ineffective devices reach the market. 46
3. Class III: Pre-Market Approval
Class III devices comprise the highest range of the risk spectrum. 47
at 187.
40

Powell, supra note 14, at 187.
Id.; Scott, supra note 20, at 380–81.
42
COMMITTEE ON THE PUB. HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE
PROCESS, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S
HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 86–87 (2011); Scott, supra
note 20, at 381; Premarket Notification 510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda
.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-notification-510k (last updated Sept.
27, 2018).
43
Scott, supra note 20, at 381; Premarket Notification 510(k), supra note 42.
44
Junod, supra note 6, at 27.
45
21 C.F.R. § 807.81 (2012); Scott, supra note 20, at 381.
46
Powell, supra note 14, at 188; see COMMITTEE ON THE PUB. HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE P ROCESS, supra note 42, at 193.
47
Scott, supra note 20, at 381; see Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-approval41
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Such devices are used in “supporting or sustaining human life or for . . .
preventing impairment of human health, or . . . [possess] a potential
unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” 48 Examples of Class III devices
include pacemakers, cochlear implants, and some surgical meshes. 49
In general, Class III devices must be vetted through the FDA’s
rigorous pre-market approval (PMA) process, unless substantial
equivalence allows for use of the alternative 510(k) process. 50 The PMA
process, which imposes greater demands and is more time intensive than
the 510(k) process, is aimed at ensuring device safety and effectiveness. 51
To establish these aims, device manufacturers are required to submit
extensive information and data derived from both nonclinical laboratory
studies and clinical human subjects investigations. 52 Prior to initiating
these studies, manufacturers must first obtain investigational device
exemption (IDE) approval from the FDA. 53 IDE approval permits
investigational devices to be used in studies for purposes of generating
safety and effectiveness data in support of the PMA. 54
The relative burdens imposed on both the FDA and device
manufacturers pursuant to the PMA process are significantly greater than
under the 510(k) pre-market notification pathway. 55 The average amount
of time the FDA spends reviewing a 510(k) submission is twenty hours, as
compared to an average of twelve hundred hours for a PMA submission. 56
Additionally, the cost for manufacturers to complete the PMA process is
three times more than the 510(k) process. 57 Accordingly, manufacturers
are strongly incentivized to establish 510(k) substantial equivalence in

pma (last updated May 16, 2019).
48
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2012).
49
Powell, supra note 14, at 188.
50
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C); 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(3) (2019); Powell, supra note 14, at
188.
51
21 C.F.R. § 860.7(c); Scott, supra note 20, at 381.
52
See 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2019).
53
Device Advice: Investigational Device Exemption (IDE), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/how-study-and-market-your-device/device-adviceinvestigational-device-exemption-ide (last updated Sept. 27, 2018); Scott, supra note 20, at
381–82.
54
Device Advice: Investigational Device Exemption (IDE), supra note 53; Scott, supra
note 20, at 382.
55
Powell, supra note 14, at 188.
56
Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478–79 (1996) (citing Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
100th Cong. 384 (1987))).
57
Powell, supra note 14, at 189.
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order to avoid the onerous PMA process. 58
B. The Policy Goals of the Medical Device Classification System
According to the MDA, the main objective of the device classification
system is to “provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness”
of the devices that the FDA allows to enter into the market. 59 Devices are
considered safe if the “probable benefits to health” outweigh the “probable
risks.”60 Devices are considered effective if “clinically significant results”
are achieved in a “significant portion of the target population.” 61 The
Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) is the division within
the FDA that is primarily responsible for device regulation. 62 CDHR’s
identified mission is “to protect and promote the public health” by assuring
that “patients and providers have timely and continued access to safe,
effective, and high-quality medical devices.”63 Accordingly, to fulfill its
mission of ensuring the safety and effectiveness of medical devices, the
FDA must ensure that its regulatory review process is capable of accurately
predicting the future impact of devices on human health in a wide range of
circumstances.64
The time required to ensure product safety and efficacy is in direct
tension with the medical device industry’s goal of getting innovative new
devices to market within a reasonably efficient timeframe. 65 This
conflicting consideration highlights some of the criticisms that skeptics
often levy against the American regulatory system. 66 As compared to the
more expedited European Union model, device regulation in the United
States is commonly considered to be “too slow, risk adverse, and

58

Id.
21 U.S.C. §§ 360c (a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii), (a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i), (e)(2)(A)–(B) (2012);
Powell, supra note 14, at 195.
60
21 C.F.R. § 860.7(d)(1) (2016).
61
21 C.F.R. § 860.7(e)(1).
62
CDRH Mission, Vision and Shared Values, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-devices-and-radiological-health/cdrh-mission-visionand-shared-values (last updated Oct. 23, 2017).
63
Id.
64
Powell, supra note 14, at 196; see also 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(c)–(e) (2016).
65
Powell, supra note 14, at 197; see Letter from Jeffrey Shuren, Director, FDA’s
Center for Devices and Radiological Health, to the American Public (2010) (“[T]he FDA’s
medical device center has been hearing major concerns about the 510(k) program . . .
[namely that it] stifles innovation . . . [and that it] isn’t sufficiently robust to assure that
some devices cleared under the program are safe and effective”.).
66
Powell, supra note 14, at 198–99.
59
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expensive.”67 In light of this viewpoint, commentators have argued that the
FDA should bring new devices to market more quickly by reallocating all
or a portion of the required pre-market review to the post-market period.68
It is crucial for the FDA to protect the public through regulation while
simultaneously fostering an environment that promotes innovation. 69
Protection is essential because the public is vulnerable to medical product
manufacturers.70
Manufacturers are privy to considerably more
information about their products, which results in information asymmetry. 71
As medical devices continue to become more complex, the degree of
information asymmetry likewise continues to expand. 72 For example, there
is little, if any, information asymmetry associated with the tongue
depressor, meaning that the public can readily ascertain relevant product
information. 73 Conversely, it is unfeasible for the general public to
evaluate the safety and efficacy of pacemakers, for instance. 74 Encouraging
innovation enables manufacturers to capitalize on advances in technology
to create safer, more effective, well-regulated medical products for the
public.75
C. The Legislative History of the FDA
Despite the complementary policy goals of ensuring safety and
efficacy while simultaneously fostering industry advancement, the FDA’s
legislative history reveals that it perpetually lags behind technological
innovation.76 In short, the FDA’s legislative history is characterized by
reactionary measures rather than comprehensive foresight.77 Congress has
historically reacted to high profile catastrophes by passing legislation in an

67
Powell, supra note 14, at 198 (citing Corinna Sorenson & Michael Drummond,
Improving Medical Device Regulation: The United States and Europe in Perspective, 92
MILBANK Q. 114, 115 (2014)); see also Scott, supra note 20, at 378 (“U.S. patients must
wait months, and sometimes even years, before the latest American-developed device
technologies are available in the U.S.”).
68
Powell, supra note 14, at 199; see id. at n.189.
69
Marilyn Uzdavines, Dying for a Solution: The Regulation of Medical Devices Falls
Short in the 21st Century Cures Act, 18 NEV. L.J. 629, 630 (2018).
70
Id. at 630–31.
71
Id. at 631.
72
Id.
73
Id. at n.9.
74
Id.
75
Uzdavines, supra note 69, at 630.
76
Uzdavines, supra note 69, at 631.
77
Id.
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attempt to correct the disconnect between technology and legislation. 78
The shortcoming of such legislation, however, is that it imposes too great
of a burden on the FDA in regulating medical devices without accounting
for the agency’s resource limitations. 79 Accordingly, there has been
inconsistent regulation of potentially harmful medical devices. 80
Legislation enacted to increase the safety and efficacy of medical
devices has historically taken a myopic view of the FDA’s duty to the
public.81 This approach has resulted in an unfortunate oscillation between
excessive regulation and insufficient regulation. 82 More specifically,
legislative reform can be characterized as taking one of two approaches. 83
Some amendments have sought to protect the public by increasing “the
scope of FDA regulation, thereby increasing the burden on manufacturers
to bring products to market.”84 Alternatively, other amendments have
focused “on fostering innovation and the public’s access to drugs and
devices, thereby reducing the burden on manufacturers without accounting
for impact on safety to the public.” 85 As technology continues to advance
and algorithm-based medical innovations become more commonplace,
there will be an increased need for comprehensive approaches. 86
D. The Division Between Federal Regulation and the Practice of
Medicine
Despite the FDA’s seemingly straightforward three-tiered device
classification system and corresponding pre-market controls, the regulatory
landscape it governs is inherently complex. 87 Despite such complexity, one
conclusive fact is that the FDA does not have the authority to regulate the
practice of medicine. 88 Accordingly, there is an acute distinction between
product manufacturers that are within the ambit of FDA regulation and
78

Id.
Id. at 632.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Uzdavines, supra note 69, at 632.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
See id.
87
Scott, supra note 20, at 382.
88
FDA’s Role in Regulating Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (last
updated Aug. 31, 2018) (“The FDA does not have the authority to: . . . tell providers what to
do when running their business or what they can or cannot tell their patients[,] [m]ake
recommendations for individual doctors, . . . [or] [c]onduct or provide a rating system on
any regulated medical devices.”).
79
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healthcare service providers who are beyond the scope of the FDA’s
purview. 89 Nevertheless, identifying precisely where the dividing line
between these distinct entities falls is both crucial and contested.90 As
emerging technologies continue to transform the field of medicine, such
advancements are effectuating a shift from mass-market distribution
models to customized, individual-oriented approaches, such as 3D-printed
devices and individually-tailored software.91 Consequently, the distinction
between regulated product manufacturers and non-regulated healthcare
providers is becoming increasingly distorted, raising profound questions
about the appropriate function of the FDA within the evolving regulatory
landscape.92
When enacting the FDCA, Congress made it abundantly clear that
federal regulation was not intended to interfere with the practice of
medicine.93 Although subsequent amendments to the FDCA expanded the
scope of the FDA’s regulatory authority, this fundamental restriction has
never been impinged upon. 94 From the time of the original statute’s
enactment, the FDA has never claimed the authority to prohibit physicians
from prescribing approved products for unapproved, off-label uses.95 After
medical devices receive FDA approval, states regulate their use in the
context of the practice of medicine pursuant to state-based plenary police
powers.96 Accordingly, the scope of the FDA’s regulatory authority
encompasses the manufacture, promotion, and dissemination of medical
devices, but does not extend to practitioners’ delivery of medical services
utilizing those devices.97
If technology-based medical devices incorporate algorithms to direct
patient care, then FDA regulation of medical software may be construed as

89

Laakmann, supra note 12, at 287.
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Laakmann, supra note 12, at 294.
94
Id.
95
21 U.S.C. § 396 (2018) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any
legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health
care practitioner-patient relationship.”); see also Laakmann, supra note 12, at 295.
96
Laakmann, supra note 12, at 295; see also Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to
Federalism in Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 159 (2004)
(“The Supreme Court long ago recognized that the police powers of the states justified their
regulation of the practice of medicine.”).
97
Laakmann, supra note 12, at 295.
90
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infringing on the practice of medicine. 98 Irrespective of this possibility, the
FDA has clearly asserted its jurisdiction over the regulation of standalone
software products. 99
III. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE FIELD OF MEDICINE
A. The Trend Toward Personalized Medicine
The entire field of medicine has been impacted by advances in
medical technology, which have enabled practitioners to offer unique
treatment options to their patients. 100 Not only do these innovative
treatment alternatives reflect the latest medical standards, but collectively
they also represent the industry-wide trend toward customized medicine. 101
Although most devices are not yet patient-specific, technology is
progressing towards this becoming a reality.102
With the advent of data collection and aggregation, large datasets can
be analyzed using artificial intelligence. 103 When implemented in the
context of medical devices, such devices can process vast quantities of
collected data to generate insights in the form of individually-tailored
outputs.104 For example, technology-based devices that interface with
mobile applications are capable of accumulating an unquantifiable amount
of health and wellness data about users.105 Accordingly, algorithm-based
medical devises, unlike mass-produced unitary devices that consistently
perform in the same predetermined manner for all patients, achieve
personalized results by adapting to the unique aspects of the individual. 106
B. Emerging Technology in Robotics and Artificial Intelligence
With increasing frequency, individuals in the field of medicine turn to
algorithms to assist in solving complex health problems. 107 Devices that
98

W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421,
441–42 (2017).
99
Id. at 442.
100
Junod, supra note 6, at 27.
101
Laakmann, supra note 12, at 325.
102
Kelly, supra note 11, at 520–21.
103
Drew Simshaw, Nicolas Terry, Kris Hauser & M.L. Cummings, Regulating
Healthcare Robots: Maximizing Opportunities While Minimizing Risks, 22 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 11 (2016).
104
See id.
105
Id. at 13.
106
Id.
107
Price, supra note 98, at 474.
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incorporate artificial intelligence have the capacity to analyze and respond
to data by changing over time. 108 In general, algorithms are derived from
sophisticated machine-learning techniques that analyze large datasets of
health information.109 Developers of such algorithms are inclined to “keep
information about [them] secret [in order to] preserve competitive
advantage.”110
Since their inception, implanted devices have served a wide range of
functions, including physical, such as pacemakers and artificial limbs;
chemical, such as insulin pumps; and sensory, such as cochlear and retinal
implants.111 As technology has progressed over time, medical devices have
advanced to incorporate machine learning technology and thus, have
become exponentially more complex.112 This complexity stems from the
adaptive nature of artificial intelligence, which by definition does not
produce predetermined outcomes. 113 Accordingly, there is some degree of
agency that is ascribed to such systems, which is neither fully predictable
by the device manufacturer nor fully controllable by the human agents
interacting with such devices.114 The inherently independent, adaptive
quality of artificial intelligence systems results in medical devices that, to
some degree, “make autonomous decisions and . . . [act on] their own
initiative.”115 The degree of device autonomy ranges from a “supervisory
control paradigm, in which certain functions are automated with a human
supervising the system, all the way to fully autonomous robots.”116
Once medical devices are software-based, there are essentially
limitless variations for the ways in which technology may impact their
functioning. 117 This inherent variability is the driving force behind the
108
Jessica S. Allain, From Jeopardy! to Jaundice: The Medical Liability Implications of
Dr. Watson and Other Artificial Intelligence Systems, 73 LA. L. REV. 1049, 1078 (2013).
109
Price, supra note 98, at 430.
110
Price, supra note 98, at 436; see also id. at 436 n.73.
111
Courtney S. Campbell, Lauren A. Clark, David Loy, James F. Keenan, Kathleen
Matthews, Terry Winograd & Laurie Zoloth, The Bodily Incorporation of Mechanical
Devices: Ethical and Religious Issues (Part 1), 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 229,
233 (2007).
112
See Philipp Kellmeyer, Thomas Cochrane, Oliver Muller, Christine Mitchell, Tonio
Ball, Joseph J. Fins & Nikola Biller-Andorno, The Effects of Closed-Loop Medical Devices
on the Autonomy and Accountability of Persons and Systems, 25 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 623, 625 (2016).
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Allain, supra note 108, at 1078.
116
Simshaw et al., supra note 103, at 3.
117
See Roland Knight, Additive Manufacturing of Medical Devices: Maintaining
Innovation, Protecting Patients and Avoiding Regulatory Duplication, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV.
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regulatory challenges faced by the FDA, which is charged with ensuring
the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. 118 To achieve its mandate,
the FDA must proactively confront the regulation of medical devices that
incorporate machine-based learning, which can be characterized as moving
targets.119
C. Oversight and Cost of Care Challenges Associated with Emerging
Technologies
It is irrefutable that the United States is the global leader in healthcare
expenditures, spending more money on healthcare than any other nation. 120
A significant driver of healthcare spending is technology, which presents a
host of regulatory oversight challenges. 121
Additionally, the vast
complexity of the American healthcare system is partially attributable to
the amalgam of applicable federal and state laws and regulations. 122
Accordingly, medical device technology is both “directly and indirectly
affected by” a robust body of laws and regulations.123 This reality
underscores the need for a nuanced regulatory framework that is predicated
on an understanding of these vastly complex dynamics.
D. Challenges Associated with the Regulation of Software
Sophisticated medical software, robotics, and machine-based learning
are rapidly evolving and contributing to the changing medical device
landscape.124 With the advent of software-based biomedical devices, code
is supplementing physical functionality. 125 Consequently, the FDA must
confront new challenges associated with the regulation of not only new
devices, but also their accompanying software and digital output.126 For
example, software increasingly controls the operation of medical devices
such as insulin pumps and pacemakers, which means that the safety
features of such devices are also dependent upon programming. 127 The
incorporation of digital features adds an additional layer of regulatory
125, 129 (2016).
118
Hutt, supra note 20, at 106.
119
See Knight, supra note 117, at 129.
120
Foote, supra note 1, at 85.
121
Foote, supra note 1, at 85–86.
122
Foote, supra note 1, at 82.
123
Id.
124
Junod, supra note 6, at 30.
125
Ohm & Reid, supra note 8, at 1673.
126
Ohm & Reid, supra note 8, at 1675.
127
Ohm & Reid, supra note 8, at 1677.

LEVINE (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

12/17/2019 2:37 PM

COMMENT

819

complexity because software can be easily manipulated, allowing its
evolution to outpace that of the devices it accompanies. 128 Accordingly,
software cannot be regulated in the same manner as devices because
verifying the operation of digital code presents unique theoretical and
practical challenges.129
The FDA has long exercised regulatory authority over medical
software.130 Despite its longstanding control, the FDA has promulgated
few regulations specifically tailored to software or algorithms. 131 The
agency has instead chosen to issue nonbinding guidance documents and to
regulate via case-specific adjudication.132
Notably, algorithm-based
medical devices are typically approved through the 510(k) pathway. 133
Pursuant to this regulatory approval process, the “FDA has often
determined that software applications are equivalent to nonsoftware
precedents, even though they perform tasks in a markedly different
manner.”134 This current disconnect between the implementation and
regulation of medical software necessitates a narrowly tailored regulatory
response.
IV. INSIGHTS GAINED FROM ANALOGOUS INDUSTRIES
A. The Regulation of 3D Printing
Like artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, commonly
referred to as 3D printing, is a technological innovation that raises
interesting questions about the scope of the FDA’s regulatory authority. 135
Within the healthcare industry, 3D printing has the potential to significantly
disrupt conventional supply chain procedures and thus warrants close
consideration.136 Customized medical devices, such as joints and spinal
implants, can be created based on individual patient scans with relative
ease.137
Consistent with the general departure from mass-market
128

Ohm & Reid, supra note 8, at 1688.
Ohm & Reid, supra note 8, at 1689.
130
Price, supra note 98, at 443; see also id. at 438 n.85.
131
Price, supra note 98, at 443; see also Ohm & Reid, supra note 8, at n.111 (citing 17
U.S.C. § 512 (2012)).
132
Price, supra note 98, at 443.
133
Price, supra note 98, at 444; see Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, 47
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1173, 1219 (2014).
134
Price, supra note 98, at 444; see Cortez, supra note 133, at 1219.
135
Laakmann, supra note 12, at 317.
136
Laakmann, supra note 12, at 318.
137
Janet Morrissey, The Instant, Custom, Connected Future of Medical Devices, N.Y.
129
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distribution to individually-targeted approaches, physicians and surgeons
can use 3D printers to create customized products on-site.138 The ability to
self-manufacture individualized products represents a marked departure
from the traditional model whereby conventional suppliers mass produce
and distribute identical items. 139 The FDA has begun to address 3D
printing, even though some critics claim that such localized production may
fall outside the scope of the agency’s statutory authority. 140 To date, the
full extent of the regulatory implications of 3D printing technology remains
unexamined.141
Within the realm of medical devices, the primary consideration is
whether the FDA will classify 3D printed items as custom devices. 142
Section 520(b) of the FDCA, as amended in 2012, states that the
performance standard requirements of section 314 and the pre-market
approval requirements of section 515 are not applicable to devices that, in
order to comply with the orders of a physician differ from an otherwise
applicable performance standard or PMA application. 143 The custom
device exemption is only applicable to devices that are “not generally
available for commercial distribution,” are designed to treat a unique
condition, and are manufactured on an individualized basis to
accommodate the unique needs of individual patients or providers. 144
Although 3D printed products may satisfy the elements of the custom
device exemption, it remains unclear if this pathway is a viable regulatory
strategy for manufacturers seeking to circumvent federal regulatory
requirements. 145 Notably, the FDCA limits production of custom devices
to a maximum of five units per year of a distinct device type. 146
Accordingly, the extent to which manufacturers of 3D printed devices may
rely on the custom device exception depends on whether the FDA

TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/business/smart-medicaldevices-implants.html.
138
Laakmann, supra note 12, at 319.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
21 U.S.C. § 360j(b)(1)(A) (B) (2012); Laakmann, supra note 12, at 319–20.
144
21 U.S.C. § 360j(b)(1)(C) (G); Laakmann, supra note 12, at 320.
145
Laakmann, supra note 12, at 320; see Laakmann, supra note 12, at 318 n.240
(“[A]lmost all of the legally marketed 3D-printed medical devices were cleared by the FDA
via the 510(k) pathway and a small number were authorized for emergency use,
compassionate use, or via the custom device exemption pathway.”).
146
21 U.S.C. § 360j(b)(2)(B); Laakmann, supra note 12, at 320.
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determines that such products comprise their own unique device types. 147
Insights gleaned from additive manufacturing may prove to be
informative in seeking to determine the appropriate regulatory pathway for
AI-based medical devices. Despite statutory amendments implemented
since the enactment of the FDCA, the FDA’s existing regulatory
framework is not optimally suited to vet and approve emerging technologydriven medical innovations.148 Like 3D printed products, AI-based devices
are perpetually advancing, and as such, represent a dramatically different
landscape than what the industry originally contemplated. 149
B. The Regulation of Mobile Health Applications
Technology has led to the proliferation of mobile health applications
that perform a wide range of functions. 150 Digital psychiatric therapies
represent a growing segment of the digital health landscape and allow for a
range of approaches to mental health care aimed at different populations
and conditions.151 The FDA has the authority “to regulate digital
psychiatric therapies as medical devices” if the applicable statutory
requirements are met. 152 Given that the science supporting the use of apps
for mental health is only just beginning to emerge, it is currently unclear
whether and how such mobile apps should be regulated. 153 The FDA has
claimed regulatory authority over mobile health apps and approved the first
digital psychiatric therapy for the treatment of substance use disorder.154
It is evident that the “current regulatory framework is inadequate” as
applied to mobile health applications because it does not specifically
address this treatment modality and, therefore, may not ensure safety and
efficacy.155 The FDA has recognized that its “traditional relatively rigid
regulatory approaches may interact poorly with the fluid and fast-moving
147

Laakmann, supra note 12, at 320.
Kelly, supra note 11, at 544.
149
Id.
150
Theodore T. Lee, Recommendations for Regulating Software-Based Medical
Treatments: Learning from Therapies for Psychiatric Conditions, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 66,
66–67 (2018); see Cortez, supra note 133, at 1181–90 (providing a taxonomy of mobile
health technologies).
151
Lee, supra note 150, at 71.
152
Lee, supra note 150, at 76.
153
Lee, supra note 150, at 70; see also id. at n.26.
154
Lee, supra note 150, at 68; see also id. at n.11 (citing FDA Permits Marketing of
Mobile Medical Application for Substance Use Disorder, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 14,
2017), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-permits-marketing-mobi
le-medical-application-substance-use-disorder).
155
Lee, supra note 150, at 91.
148
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structure of the mobile-health industry.”156
Notwithstanding this
recognition, the majority of mobile health applications appear to be subject
to the FDA’s oversight as medical devices and are subject to traditional
regulatory requirements.157 Guidance documents issued by the FDA fail to
clearly address whether the agency will enforce FDCA requirements for
mobile health applications and related software-based treatments. 158
Similarly, it is unknown how the FDA will choose to apply the 510(k)
pathway. 159 Due to their intended function, there are safety and
effectiveness-related concerns regarding the use of digital psychiatric
therapies.160 Counterbalanced against this concern, however, is the worry
that increasing FDA clearance or approval standards could stifle
innovation.161 It is possible that some software-based treatments may
evade the FDA’s regulatory authority by not manifesting “an intent to treat
or mitigate the symptoms” associated with a specific disease or
condition. 162 For the software-based treatments that do fall within the
scope of the FDCA, there is a need for the FDA to articulate whether it will
enforce its requirements when evaluating them. 163
V. RECOMMENDATION FOR REGULATING ADAPTIVE, TECHNOLOGYDRIVEN MEDICAL DEVICES
This Section explores the criticisms levied against the current
regulatory framework as well as measures the FDA can implement to
achieve a comprehensive regulatory approach that is specifically tailored to
software-based medical devices.
A. Criticism of the Current Regulatory Standard
There is a general consensus among courts, commentators, and the
FDA itself that the current regulatory approval process for medical devices
is too slow,164 too costly, 165 and too unpredictable.166 Given that softwarebased medical devices can be developed quickly and are highly
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Price, supra note 98, at 449.
Id.
Lee, supra note 150, at 91.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Powell, supra note 14, at 201 n.202.
Powell, supra note 14, at 201 n.203.
Powell, supra note 14, at 201.
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customizable, the current regulatory scheme warrants supplementation. 167
Some algorithms change and progress as new data are incorporated,
rendering them incompatible with regulatory approval measures predicated
on the unchangeability of devices. 168 Accordingly, rigid adherence to
existing regulatory standards would hinder the development and
implementation of innovative and potentially groundbreaking new medical
devices. 169
If the incorporation of algorithm-based software necessitates Class III
categorization, then medical device innovation will likely be severely
impeded. 170 First, automatically employing this classification will result in
substantially greater obstacles getting devices to market. 171 Second, it will
significantly limit the flexibility of algorithms to change and evolve as
manufacturers continue to gather and incorporate additional data.172
As the preeminent public health agency, the FDA is charged with
preventing unsafe and ineffective therapies from entering the market and
reaching the public. 173 FDA regulation shapes innovation within the
healthcare industry by establishing the standards that drug and device
manufacturers must satisfy before marketing their products. 174 Some
scholars have argued that FDA regulatory measures intended to protect
patients unnecessarily hinder innovation and prevent patients from
accessing potentially helpful therapies.175 Some have leveled this criticism
within the context of the FDA’s regulation of emerging health technologies
as well.176 Other scholars, however, “have noted the role FDA regulation
plays in incentivizing the production of valuable information about
regulated products.”177
B. Constructing a Comprehensive and Consistent Regulatory Scheme
It is incumbent on the FDA to evaluate and respond to concerns
regarding safety and effectiveness standards, the risk of stifling innovation,

167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Price, supra note 98, at 423.
Price, supra note 98, at 423–24.
Price, supra note 98, at 424.
Price, supra note 98, at 452–53.
Price, supra note 98, at 453.
Id.
Lee, supra note 150, at 70.
See Lee, supra note 150, at 70 n.27.
Lee, supra note 150, at 70; see id. at n.28.
Lee, supra note 150, at 70; see id. at n.29.
Lee, supra note 150, at 70; see id. at n.30.
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and existing regulatory uncertainty.178 To this end, the federal government
should develop a separate regulatory framework for algorithm-based
medical devices. An optimal regulatory approach must be sufficiently
flexible to accommodate the highly variable nature of technological
innovation.179 The first step towards designing such a framework is
understanding that pre-market controls are necessarily limited in their
ability to fully vet algorithms that cannot be predicted to an absolute degree
of certainty.180 Achieving a framework that comports with the FDA’s
safety and efficacy standards in light of ever-changing technological
considerations poses significant challenges. 181 Despite such obstacles, the
FDA can seek to ameliorate this shortcoming by enhancing post-market
surveillance in the form of real-world quality markers to provide for more
robust regulation following market entry. 182
Considering the scope of this endeavor, the FDA should seek to
employ a collaborative approach that involves multiple entities. 183 More
specifically, the FDA should maintain centralized regulatory oversight but
incorporate other entities in the healthcare industry, such as physicians and
hospitals, to construct a more robust and elaborate post-market surveillance
system. 184 By diversifying the responsibility for post-market surveillance
and oversight, the FDA can then implement an incremental, adaptive
regulatory framework that has the flexibility to respond to new information
as technology develops and new data is acquired. 185 Such an approach is
ideal because depending solely on pre-market regulation for medical
algorithms will not achieve the optimal balance between fostering
innovation and ensuring safety and effectiveness. 186 Technology-based
medical devices derive their value from their ability to interface with
patients and amass data that can then be integrated into their
functionality. 187 Post-market surveillance measures would complement
these algorithmic features in a way that overly burdensome pre-market
approvals do not because of the time and resources required. 188 This notion
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Lee, supra note 150, at 97.
Price, supra note 98, at 423.
Id.
Id.
Price, supra note 98, at 424.
Price, supra note 98, at 458.
Price, supra note 98, at 458–59.
Price, supra note 98, at 460.
Price, supra note 98, at 462.
Id.
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is similar to incremental physical changes made to medical devices over the
course of their lifespan, rendering a pre-market review of each iteration
infeasible. 189
The FDA has already demonstrated a willingness to merge pre-market
and post-market review in some contexts. 190 When the FDA engages in
pre-market approval review it considers what clinical data would be
necessary to establish safety and effectiveness prior to approval, as
compared to what data can be collected during the post-market phase. 191
There are, however, significant challenges associated with relying on postmarket surveillance. 192 Most significantly, the FDA has long overseen
post-market surveillance programs without much success. 193 Compliance
tends to be low because such measures are often voluntary and the FDA
does not have adequate enforcement resources to compel adherence. 194
Despite this reality, there are three distinct measures that the FDA can
implement to make post-market surveillance better suited to regulate
algorithm-based medical devices.195 First, if Congress were to allocate
additional authority and resources to the FDA it may be possible to
implement and enforce surveillance requirements. 196 Second, monitoring
will likely become easier as health information systems continue to become
more integrated, allowing data to be more easily shared. 197 Third, if postmarket surveillance involves other entities in the healthcare industry
beyond the FDA, then surveillance will be more comprehensive. 198
One feature that the FDA can incorporate into a new, algorithm-based
framework is a backup regulatory program. 199 Accordingly, the risks
189
Price, supra note 98, at 462 n.236; see Frederic S. Resnic & Sharon-Lise T.
Normand, Postmarketing Surveillance of Medical Devices—Filling in the Gaps, 366 N.
ENGL. J. MED. 875 (2012) (advocating for comprehensive review of postmarket surveillance
systems given the realities of device development and evolution).
190
Price, supra note 98, at 463; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BALANCING PREMARKET
AND P OSTMARKET DATA COLLECTION FOR DEVICES SUBJECT TO PREMARKET APPROVAL:
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2015); see also 21
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(C), (a)(3)(D)(ii) (2012) (enabling such balancing).
191
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(3)(D)(ii) (2012).
192
Price, supra note 98, at 464.
193
Id.; see generally Phil B. Fontanarosa et al., Postmarketing Surveillance—Lack of
Vigilance, Lack of Trust, 292 JAMA 2647 (2004) (discussing problems with the postmarket
surveillance system).
194
Fintanarosa et al., supra note 193, at 2649.
195
Price, supra note 98, at 464.
196
Id.; see Resnic & Normand, supra note 189, at 877.
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Price, supra note 98, at 464.
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Price, supra note 98, at 465.
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associated with lessened pre-market approval could be counterbalanced
through the construction and implementation of a backup program that
would be automatically deployed if software adaptations are determined to
be less safe or efficacious than permissible under current FDA standards. 200
This approach would accord new technologies greater regulatory freedom
at the outset by permitting them to function without first submitting to the
full range of costly, time-intensive pre-market restrictions. 201 Under this
type of hybrid regulatory scheme, software-based medical devices would
be able to capitalize on the fast-paced nature of technological
advancements while the FDA simultaneously safeguards against potential
risk through more traditional, risk-based controls.202
VI. CONCLUSION
Algorithm-based medical devices represent the culmination of
advances in both technology and medicine. The industry is currently at the
threshold of what is poised to be an exponential growth in medical devices
that incorporate features of machine learning and artificial intelligence to
enhance their therapeutic effects. Although adaptability is the key feature
of such devices, it is also the driving force behind the associated regulatory
challenges. To capitalize on the immense potential for unprecedented
medical breakthroughs associated with improving duration and quality of
life, it is critical that the FDA take affirmative steps to implement an
appropriate regulatory framework. Unlike devices that perform discrete
and immutable functions, technology-based medical devices are inherently
variable. Given the impending proliferation of such devices, the FDA will
face immense challenges if it relies on the current regulatory framework,
which cannot keep pace with the rapid evolution of technology. The
optimal regulatory approach is to create a separate pathway for softwarebased medical devices that enables the FDA to maintain flexible oversight
over their safety and effectiveness without stifling technological
innovation.

Governance Toolbox for Emerging Technologies, 51 U.C.D. L. REV. 233, 264 (2017).
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